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EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS OF CITIES

THE EXTIATERRITORIAL POWERS OF CITIES'

By WILLIAm ANDERSON*
THE

T

CONCEPT OF THE MUNICIPAL

AREA

problem with which this paper will deal is simply that
of the powers which a mumcipal corporation may exercise
beyond its ordinary territorial limits. Everyone is familiar with
the fact that laws and charters lay down boundaries which define
the areas in and over which particular cities may exercise their
powers and carry out their functions. Almost everyone is aware,
however, that these ordinary boundaries prove quite inadequate
for many local purposes. A city is not a self-sufficing unit. In
many cases it needs to go outside its area to find an adequate
vater supply and suitable locations for hospitals, correctional inAtitutions, parks, sewage disposal works, and other amenities.
Nuisances created just outside of city limits prove dangerous to
the local health anid safety. Bridges, ferries, and roads are often
of little value to the city unless they actually extend into neighboring communities. City planning is but a step toward regional
or metropolitan planning. And if these things are true in small
places, they are many times more true of congested cities closely
encircled by suburban communities which have received the overflow of the city's population. For the problems which arise in
such urban agglomerations many solutions have been proposed
and tried. The one to which we here pay attention has received
little attention in discussions of local government, but has had
a very wide application in practice.2
What powers may a. city exercise beyond its boundaries? To
answer this question we need first to know, what are the boundaries of the city' What is meant by the area of the city' At
HE

*Professor of Political Stience, University of Minnesota.
'The Oregon supreme court fias used the term "extra-mural powers,"
with a slightly different connotation, and this term has been adopted by
McQuillin, and by Tooke in his recent casebook on municipal corporations.
See State ex rel. v. Port of Astoria, (1916) 79 Or. 1, 154 Pac. 399, 405;
7-Mc Quillin, Mun. Corps. 6616; Tooke, A Selection of Cases on the Law
of Municipal
Corporations 1309.
2
n addition to scattered passages on the subject in.Dillon, McQuillin,
and the digests, see Woolston, Municipal Zones in 3 Nat. Mun. Rev.
465-73.
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first blush the answer seems very simple. Everything inside of
a single fixed and continuous line, usually described in the charter as the city's boundary, is and must be a part of the city, whereas everything outside must be absolutely excluded from its jurisdiction. Such a conception, which assumes the complete and perfect unity of the city's area, has in fact received some judicial
sanction. It has been said that
"The legal as well as the popular idea of a town or city in
this country, both by name and use, is that of oneness, community, locality, vicinity ;" and that "as to territorial extent, the idea
of a city is one of unity, not of plurality,
of compactness or con'3
tiguity, not separation or segregation."
Hence it was held that a legislature has no power to make one
city out of two non-contiguous tracts of land. Conversely it has
been held that a statute authorizing the annexation of "contiguous" land cannot be construed to authorize a city to annex land of
such shape that, as a result of the annexation, a separate tract,
a sort of "no man's land" would be wholly enclosed by the city
4
without being a part of it.
"If that could be done by annexation, a city might become a
mere ring, hoop or belt around a large unincorporated area, which,
of course, was never in contemplation when the statute was enacted."
Decisions such as we have here cited give an unnatural precision to the conception of the municipal area, and seem to assert
that every city must be territorially just like every other Historically there is little warrant for such a view. In the development of the English municipal corporation there were many cases
of corporations which controlled several non-contiguous areas,
as well as of corporations whose areas enclosed lands over which
they had no control. Summarizing the findings of the commisaCity of Denver v. Coulehan, (1894) 20 Colo. 471, 39 Pac. 425, 27
L. R. A. 751. See also Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Town of
Oconto, (1880) 50 Wis. 189. 6 N. W 607, 36 Am. Rep. 840 note, and
Smith v. Sherry, (1880) 50 Wis. 210, 6 N. W 561. An unusual set of
facts is reported in Wild v. The People, (1907) 227 Ill. 556, 81 N. E. 707
4Village of Morgan Park v. City of Chicago, (1912) 255 Ill.
190,

99 N. E. 388, Ann. Cas. 1913D. 399, and note. But it is a little difficult

to see how "No Man's Land" was any better off completely surrounded
by two corporations than it would 'have been surrounded by one. And
see City of Pueblo v. Stanton, (1909) 45 Colo. 523, 102 Pac. 512 where a
tract was enclosed on three sides by the city's area, and on the fourth
by a city-owned park, but it was held "that the mere purchase of property, for park purposes, does not extend the boundaries of the city, nor
annex the property to the city." The theory seems to have been that
whatever lands were enclosed by the city's boundary would be a part of
the city.
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sioners for inquiring into English municipal corporations in 1835
Cockburn said:
"In some cases, as at Grantham and Brecon, the corporate
boundary is not continuous, but includes outlying parcels of
ground. Several remarkable instances of this occur in the Cinque
Ports: one of the most striking in Hastings, where the corporate authorities have authority, among other places, over two detached precincts distant from Hastings forty and fifty miles
respectively. The town of Ramsgate is subject to the jurisdiction
of the corporation of Sandwich, as is also the corporate town of
Deal, which adjoins Sahidwich." 5
The Webbs, speaking also of the period before the Municipal
Corporations Act of 1835, said that:
"Paradoxical as it may seem, .the municipal
corporation had,
in the vast majority of cases, no one area over which it exercised
authority. A municipal corporation, like the manor and unlike
the parish and the county, was, in fact, not primarily a territorial
expression; It was a bundle of jurisdictions relating to persons,
and only incidentally to the place in which those persons happened to be. .

.

. Thus we find municipal corporations wielding

this or that power over the areas of one or more manors; other
powers over the areas of one or more parishes. Their market,
conservancy, and admiralty jurisdictions might extend for miles
into adjacent counties; far up rivers and creeks, and along estuaries and seas; including wide stretches of upland and commons,
scattered hamlets and fishing-ports." 6
On the other hand, within the ordinary boundaries the corporate churches and monasteries with their extensive estates
caused special difficulties by their claims of exemption from the
local municipal authorities. In a vivid chapter Mrs. J. R. Green
relates the legal, political, and sometimes physical struggles between the city of Exeter and -the bishops of the local cathedral.T
These struggles had gone on intermittently for three centuries at
the point where shedrops the story, and were then still far from
being ended. Within their own walls the members of the ecclesiastical community and the tenants of their estates legally lived a
life apart. They refused to recognize the police authority of the
city, they gave sanctuary and benefit of clergy to those who broke
the city's peace, they held their own court, they spurned every
suggestion that they help -to pay the city's ferm and other obli51 Cockburn, The Corporations of England and Wales, etc., p. xxv.
6S. and B. Webb, English Local Government; The Manor and the
Borough, Part One, p. 289. See also Cockburn, loc. cit; and for more
recent times Gomme, Lectures on the Principles of Local Government, 40.
7Town Life in the Fifteenth Century I, chap. XI.
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gations, they resolutely refused to take part in watch and ward,
they smuggled in liquors and food to avoid the mayor's assize
of wine, ale, and bread, they ignored all demands that they help
to maintain the town wall, and they made other claims of immunities and privileges which need not be noted here.8
What we have here given is an early example of municipal
exterritoriality " In our own land and time we have uncounted
examples of areas, great and small, within city limits, over which
the city corporation has little or no power either to regulate and
police, or to tax, or to take by eminent domain, or to interfere
with in any other way There are, in the first place, tracts owned
by and fully ceded to the national government, and used among
other things for government buildings, navy yards, barracks,
forts, and cemeteries. Over these tracts the state itself has no
power, and hence the city, which is the state's agent, can have
none. The city will probably supply water and utilities to such
government-owned areas, but it could hardly regulate the erection
or the use of buildings or the conduct of individuals therein.
The state itself may have within the city parcels of land used for
state universities and colleges, capitol and office buildings, parks
and reservations, to mention but a few uses, over which it is
likely to retain complete and direct control. 10 Then, too, the
state usually has other public agencies in the local area besides
the city government proper. There will be a county, with its
buildings and lands, perhaps an independent corporation for school
purposes, and possibly a port or harbor authority, a sanitary district, as in Chicago, or a metropolitan district, as in the Boston
area. All of these separate corporations will receive their own
powers directly from the state, and whatever lands or buildings
sCockburn, loc. cit., reports that "Frequently there are precincts locally
situated within the limits of the corporate authority, but exempted from
its jurisdiction. Such are found at York, Lincoln, Norwich, Winchester,
and Chichester. These have usually originated in ecclesiastical privileges,
or have been the site of the castle of the lord of the borough. In the
city of Canterbury there are not less than fifteen such precincts, though
some are in dispute between the counties of Kent and Canterbury." And
see Gomme, op. cit., p. 41, who cites even the Inns of Court of London
as being partly exempted from the local municipal jurisdiction.
9"Exterritoriality" is in a sense the obverse of "extraterritoriality."
That which is within the area but without the jurisdiction of a state
is "exterritorial" as to it, but that which is outside its customary area but
nevertheless within its jurisdiction is, as to it, "extraterritorial." See
W W Willoughby, The Fundamental Concepts of Public Law, 394,
339-40.
loKentucky Institute v. Louisville, (1906) 123 Ky. 767, 8 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 553, 97 S. W 402.
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they hold within the city's area may be partly or wholly immune
from the city's legal control."' But we may go even farther than
this, and call attention to the fact that one city may own or hold
for public purposes lands lying within the boundaries of another
*incorporated place. The reservoir and filtration plant of the city
of Minneapolis, to give but one example, lie in an adjoining
county within the incorporated city of Columbia Heights. Such
lands and improvements if used for public purposes will be
exempt from local taxation, and may even be exempted from the
local police power.12
These numerous tracts to which we have been calling attention are nothing less than enclaves within the city's boundaries
which enjoy partial or complete immunity from municipal control.
In sofie cases they seriously diminish the area over which the
city has jurisdicti6n. If we now look at what remains we shall
see, also, that there is much reason behind the Webbs' suggestion
that a municipal corporation is a "bundle of jurisdictions," for
even as to this remaining area the city's powers are not uniform.
Its taxing power may extend fully to some types of privately
owned real estate, but it is likely that the state laws and constitution exempt, wholly or in part, all schools, churches, parsonages,
cemeteries, as;ylums, and other institutions devoted to quasi-public uses. The taxing- power in other words, spreads very unevenly
3
over the city, and there are long lists of "tax-exempt" lands.
The police power, too, in the nature of the case, does not apply
"But there cannot as a rule be two municipal borporations for iden-

tical purposes within the same area. Hence, if the city has been given

the local police power, the county, the school district, and other local
corporations,, will logically be subject to municipal regulations as to the
construction of buildingsietc, County of Cook v. City of Chicago, (1924)
311 Ill.
234, 142 N..E. 512, 31 A. L. R. 442.
2

2 See especially Town of North Haven v. Borough of Wallingford,
(1920) 95 Conn. 544, 111 Atl. 904, Town of West Hartford v. Board
of Water Commissidners of City of Hartford, (1877) 44 Conn. 368,
City of Somerville v. City of Waltham, (1898) 170 Mass. 160, 48 N. E.
1092; City of Rochester v. Town of Rush, (1880) 80 N. Y. 302; People
ex rel. Mayor, etc., of New York v. Board of Assessors of City of
Brooklyn, -(1888) 111 N. Y. 505; 19 N. E. 90. As to police power, see
Dunham v. City of New Britain, (1887) 55 Conn. 378, 11 At. 354.
"3And in Iowa it is held in substance that agricultural lands within
the city which receive no benefits from the municipal services may not
be subjected to city taxes. Morford v. Unger, (1859) 8 Iowa 82; Durrant
v. Kauffman, (1872) 34 Iowa 194.

The same rule has been applied in

the past in Kentucky and in Nebraska; but there is nothing in the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution to forbid city taxes
on agricultural land within cities. Kelly v. Pittsburgh, (1881) 104 U. S.
78, 26 L. Ed. 659. The Iowa doctrine seems to go back to some sweeping
dicta in Cheany v. Hooser, (1848) 9 B. Munroe (Ky.) 330.
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fully and equally to all privately-owned land in the city. Railroads, for example, may be under some state control and not
subject to every local regulation. City charters and state laws
in some cases create special districts within the city for special
purposes,--districts, in former days, within which no saloons
might be licensed, zones about schools wherein certain businesses
are prohibited, and so on. The city's power of eminent domain,
likewise, does not extend fully to all lands within the city limits,
for it is obvious that lands already held for public purposes by
national, state, county, and other units of government will not be
subject to the municipal power except in rare cases.
What we have here given are various illustrations of the fact
that within many cities will be found tracts of land which are
either wholly exempt from municipal jurisdiction and control,
or are immune in whole or in part from the exercise of one or
more of the municipal powers. It is not impertinent to observe,
also, that in the exercise of its several powers a city has generally the power to make one rule for one part of the city and another rule for a different part. Abbatoirs, factories, billboards,
garages, and other institutions may be permitted in one section of
the city and forbidden in another. The height and bulk of buildings may be similarly regulated, while the erection or reconstruction of highly inflammable buildings may usually be forbidden in
so-called "fire zones," the boundaries of which are usually determined by the council. 14 In fact, in some cases it would be quite
unreasonable, and in certain instances unlawful, for the council
to make rigidly uniform regulations covering the entire municipal
area. A regulation desirable and useful in one place would be
undesirable and possibly harmful in another. In the realm of
taxation while, as a rule, the council may not establish special
exemptions, or tax property in one district more heavily than
property in another, it may usually create special assessment districts for particular purposes. Thus if one studies any city area
as a concrete illustration he will find a great many internal divisions thereof. The actual city area is not, therefore, a uniform.
unbroken thing, like a plain and seamless piece of cloth, but
rather an intricate patchwork with some noticeable rents and
holes.
14It would be futile to attempt to name all the cases which sustain
the power of municipalities under certain conditions to make intra-territoral subdivisions. A comprehensive study of "zoning" in cities, in its
broadest sense, would take tis very far back into history.
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We have tried in the few preceding paragraphs to show the
fallacies in the view that, within its ordinary boundaries, a city
government must have control, and uniform control, over every
square foot of territory We come then, again, to the boundary
itself. - What is the boundary of a city? In some cases in earlier
days the city's -wall, or well known marks, defined the limits of
the city's jurisdiction, but in many places it was customary for
the mayor and other officials to make annual perambulation of the
supposed area of the town. Many points remained vague or in
dispute, however, and when the English municipal corporations
commission made its survey less than a century ago it found many
cases of doubtful or disputed boundaries. American legislatures
and cities have in most cases taken a leaf from British experience
and have -written into the charters definite metes and bounds.15
The limits thus written down must be understood, however,
to be not the only but merely the usual limits of a city's jurisdictions, the line beyond which their powers may not ordinarily be
exercised. A municipal boundary is, in fact, not a limit of ownership but of jurisdiction, and if we remember to think of the
corporation as a "bundle of jurisdictions" we shall see that a
city may actually have several boundaries for different purposes.
The very charters which set down so definitely the ordinary
boundaries, frequently establish other boundaries fbr special purposes. For some purposes, as we have seen, a city's powers or
jurisdiction may not extend fully to its ordinary limits ;I. for
other purposes, as we shall see, its powers may extend beyond
these limits for a definite or indefinite distance. Thus the city's
boundaries, though defined, are variable according to the need or
purpose.
In discussing, as we are, an exception to the usual rule of law,
we do not wish to minimize the importance of the rule itself.
One of the outstanding charaqeristics of a municipal corporation is the possession by it, as an agent of the state, of a number
of -jurisdictions over a place. This place is, for most purposes,
defined by the ordinary boundaries. It is, ordinarily, within this
15The angularity of many cities in the states west of the Alleghanies
is due to the use of section and quarter section lines as municipal boun,daries. In the south there appear to be cases of circular cities, where
the charter merely specifies the center of the circle and the radius to be
used in describing the boundary. White v. Mayor and Council of Forsyth,
(1912) 138-Ga. 753, 76 S. E. 58: Constitution v. Chestnut Hill Cemetery
Association, (1911) 136 Ga. 778, 71 S. E. 1037 In Town of Luverne v.
Shaws, (1893) 101 Ala. 359, 13 So. 409, the boundaries seem to establish
a perfectly
square city, but the interpretation is doubtful.
16 See for example the Iowa taxation cases cited in note 13, above.
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place only that a city's regulations are binding on strangers as
well as on inhabitants. It is for this territory that the corporation
is primarily responsible, to preserve and improve it for the present
and all future generations. Whatever a city may do outside of
this ordinary area is exceptional. With this word of caution we
may pass on to some typical instances.
There are four powers essential to cities which we shall find it
important to consider briefly here. These powers are essentially
means for the accomplishment of municipal purposes. They may
be designated as (1) the police power, (2) the power of taxation, (3) the power of eminent domain, and (4) the power to do
business as a corporation and to acquire and use property for
municipal purposes by methods other than direct taxation or
eminent domain. Although the latter power appears to be used
extraterritorially more frequently than any of the other three,
it is from the legal point of view the simplest and will be first
considered.
THE EXERCISE OF BUSINESS POWERS EXTRATERRITORIALLY

Within the restricted limits of their ordinary boundaries, cities
are frequently unable to find certain materials and substances
which are essential to the provision of the ordinary municipal
services. Of these perhaps the first in importance is an adequate
and satisfactory water supply Every student is no doubt familiar
with the tales of the Roman aqueducts and of the more recent
ventures of Glasgow, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and other cities into remote regions to find water supplies for
their inhabitants. Perhaps no important American city has gone
outside of its boundaries to acquire a supply without having at
least some legislative authority to supply the inhabitants with
water. Whether the power to transcend boundaries for this
purpose must be express or may be implied has not been frequently decided. In a Georgia case where the power to establish a system of waterworks was expressed, it was held that the power
to go outside the city limits for a supply would be implied."T A
similar decision was reached in a Tennessee case with reference
to land for a reservoir.18 It is difficult to see how, in many cases,
17Hall v. Mayor and Council of Calhoun, (1913) 140 Ga. 611, 79
S. E.1 533.
sNewman v. Ashe, (1876) 9 Baxt. (Tenn.) 380. And see the interesting case of Quincy v. Boston, (1889) 148 Mass. 389, where Holmes, J.,
said "We shall assume that, if the city has power to carry water to
Long Island, it has incidental power to carry it through the highways
of Quincy."
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the -courts could reach any other conclusion without practically
emptying the express power of all content. " The selection of
the source. of supply is but the choice of means, and in numerous
cases" the city has practically very little choice.
Where a city has legally acquired an outside source, it is, of
course, subject to liability for negligence just as fully as if the
whole water system were within the city's limits. 20 In the nature
But
of the case it must, also, compensate riparlan owners.2
suppose a city has acquired water rights in some river, lake, or
watershed, may it also exercise police jurisdiction therein to prevent pollution or the destruction of dams, mains, and other
works? The statutes and charters in a number of cases seeni to
confer this power of police, but the decisions of the high state
cours have little to say upon the subject.2 2 In several cases the
state law directly prohibited pollution of streams used for water
supply, while in a leading Connecticut case the legislature had
expressly -authorized the city of New Britain to make ordinances
"for the better protection and preservation of the waters of
Shuttle Meadow Lake, so called, in the town of Southington,
and of all the waterworks of said city situate in said town," and
to prescribe penalties for violations thereof.23 In the latter case
no question seems to have been raised -as to the power of the
legislature to confer such extraterritorial police power.
19"The -familiar maxim that the grant of powers takes with it all
the necessary incidents to make that grant effectual, applies to municipal
corporations with respect to the powers and authority exercised by them."

Mun. Corps., p. 794.
I McQuillin,
2
oCity Council of Augusta v. Mackey, (1901) 113 Ga. 64, 38 S. E.
339; Mayor, etc., of City of New York v. Bailey, (1845) 2 Demo (N.Y.)
433, aff'g 3 Hill 531.
21Spark Mfg. Co. v. Town of Newton, (1899) 60 N. J. Eq. 399, 45
Ati. 596. See also Dunham v. City of New Britain, (1887) 55 Conn. 378,
11 Atl.
22 354, Burden v. Stein, (1855) 27 Ala. 104, 62 Am. Dec. 758.
There is a dictum in Chambers v. City of St. Louis, (1860) 29
Mo. 543, 575, that by the statutes authorizing the city "to hold lands
beyond her limits for objects intimately connected with the purposes of
the corporation and highly necessary for her prosperity and welfare, it
was intended that, over such places, she should exercise such police powers
as would be required in order to make them answer the purposes for
vhich they were designed." It is doubtful whether this is the prevailing

opinmon. A purchase of lands by the city is not an annexation of those
lands to the city. City of Pueblo v. Stanton, (1909) 45 Colo. 523, 102
Pac. 512. See also Lester v. Mayor, etc., of City of Jackson, (1892)
114, cited in note 66 below.
887, 11
69I Miss.
2aDunham
v. So.
City of New-Britain, (1887) 55 Conn. 378, 11 At. 354.
See also Martin v. Gleason, (1885) 139 Mass. 183, 29 N. E. 664; People
v. Borda, (1895) 105 Cal. 636, 38 Pac. 1110. On the exemption of extraterritorial water supplies, etc., from taxation, see cases cited. in note 12,
above.
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Another important question arising in the water supply cases
is whether or not a power to supply water, and to acquire an outside source, carries with it the power or the duty to sell water to
persons beyond city limits. It is scarcely to be doubted that a
legislature may expressly authorize a city to sell surplus water
outside of its city limits, but such power will not usually be implied, especially where the exercise of the power would involve
extending the mains outside of the city limits.2 4 The reason for
the latter rule seems to be that each municipality is created primarily to serve its own inhabitants and that its powers "must be
held to be limited in their exercise to the territory embraced in
the municipal boundaries and for the benefit of the inhabitants of
the municipality "25 To serve outsiders is not to benefit the inhabitants as such unless, perhaps, there is a surplus supply which
may thus be disposed of at a profit to the city 20 An exception to
this rule may exist, therefore, where the city has a surplus of
water, and where it can sell such surplus for the benefit of its
inhabitants without extending its mains into neighboring munici27

palities.

Aside from water supply, there are many things a city needs
in everyday administration which cannot in all cases be supplied
locally A city requires rock and gravel for the construction and
maintenance of streets and public buildings. May it then acquire
stone quarries outside of city limits to produce these essential
materials? In two Virginia cases it has been held that the power
to own and operate quarries extraterritorially cannot be impliedY'
The court in the first case found many activities beyond city limits
24
Mayor, etc., of Gainesville v. Dunlop, (1917) 147 Ga. 344, 94 S. E.
247, Dyer v. City of Newport, (1906) 29 Ky. L. R. 656, 94 S. W 25,
Simson v. Parker (1907) 190 N. Y. 19, 82 N. E. 732, Childs v. City of
Columbia, (1911) 87 S. C. 566. 70 S. E. 296, 34 L. R. A. (N.S.) 542,
Farwell v. City of Seattle, (1906) 43 Wash. 141, 86 Pac. 217, 10 Ann.
Cas. 130. In fact the city of Boston, with power to convey and supply
water "throughout the city" was held in one case to be without power
to convey water to Long Island, which was a part of the city but lay
three miles from the mainland. Quincy v. Boston, (1889) 148 Mass. 389.
25Childs v. City of Columbia, (1911) 87 S. C. 566, 70 S. E. 296, 34
L. R.2 A. (N.S.) 542.
6But where, as in California, the constitution requires a city taking
over a franchise to fulfill all the terms thereof, and these require service
to a neighboring municipality, the city is obligated to serve others in
order to serve its own inhabitants. City of South Pasadena v. Pasadena
Land27and Water Co., (1908) 152 Cal. 579, 93 Pac. 490.
Rogers v. City of Wickliffe, (1906) 29 Ky. L. R. 587, 94 S.W 24.
28
Duncan v. City of Lynchburg, (1900) 2 Va. Dec. 700, 34 S.E. 964,
48 L. R. A. 331, Donable's Administrator v. Town of Harrisonburg, (1905)
104 Va. 533, 52 S. E. 174, 2 L. R. A. (N.S.) 910.
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expressly authorized in the charter, but not this, and hence held
this one to be excluded by implication. The general power to
"purchase, hold, sell, and convey all real and personal property
necessary for its uses and purposes" the court held to be limited
to the city's own area save in cases where "lands are indispensably
necessary to enable it to protect the health and well-being of its
people." 29 In the second case counsel argued that the quarry was
incidental and necessary to the maintenance of streets, but the
court answered that "if that proposition could be maintained, a
municipality might engage in limitless undertakings not authorized by its charter in express words, or necessarily or fairly implied in or incidental to the powers expressly granted, the result of
which would be to expose the resources of the municipality to
constant danger of exhaustion."30
Foll wing the first Virginia decision a similar case arose in
Wisconsin, where the court considered the Virginia decision and
expressly rejected it." In this case the city had express power to
improve streets and express power also to "purchase and hold
real estate sufficient for the public use, convenience or necessities."
Conceding that a city may not extend its governmental powers
beyond its limits, the court held this to be a different matter, "the
mere exercise of a business function." In such affairs municipal
corporations should be "governed by very much the same rules
as private corporations," and "the mere act of going beyond the
boundary does not necessarily involve excess of power." There
mitfst, said the court, "be a wide range within which municipal
officers, acting in good faith, may go," but it suggested that if, in
this case, they had gone so far afield to obtain a quarry that the
element of convemence would no longer be apparent, that then
"there would undoubtedly be such an abuse of authority as to
render the acf void." In a similar case in Massachusetts the court
was also able to imply the power of a city to purchase land outside
its limits for a gravel pit.32
The water supply and quarry cases involve the question of the
power of a city to acquire rights in land outside of city limits in
29

Duncan v. City of Lynchburg, (1900) 2 Va. Dec. 700, 705, 34 S. _.
964,. 48 1- R. A. 331.
SODonable's Administrator v. Town of Harrisonburg (1905) 104 Va.
533, 534-35, 52 S. E. 174, 2 L R. A. (N.S.) 910.
31Schneider v. City of Menasha, (1903) 118 Wis. 298, 95 N. W. 94,
99 A. S. R. 996.
32City of Somerville v. City of Waltham, (1898) 170 M~ass. 160, 48
N. E. 1092.
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order to supply some substance useful and necessary for local purposes within the city A fairly harmonious group of drainage
and sewerage cases discuss the power of cities to acquire rights
in extraterritorial lands for the purpose of disposing of noxious
waste products of the city In a leading Michigan case, the city
had the express duty of providing sewers and drains, and had also
the duty to keep clean a stream which ran through its territory 33
Under these conditions, since it was difficult to find any proper
sewage outlet within the city limits, the authorities contracted
with an outside land owner to enlarge and improve a county
drainage ditch upon his premises, in return for which he was to
permit the discharge of the city's sewage through his land into the
ditch. When the city attempted to enforce the contract, the other
party denied the city's power to enter into it on the grounds that
the city had no express authority to construct such an outlet beyond its boundaries, or to make the contract described, or to
exercise any jurisdiction over the outlet when completed. Nevertheless, in view of its legal duties and its special circumstances,
the city was held by the court to have the power to make the contract in question. This was considered by the judges as but a
choice of means, and practically the only means, of accomplishing
the legally required end. In like manner the Idaho supreme
court has held the city of Boise empowered by implication to
construct a drainage ditch to a point outside of the city to carry
off overflow waters.3 4 Said the court "A grant of powers carries with it authority to do those things necessary to the exercise
of the power granted."
In other cases the power to construct sewers and drains extraterritorially has been expressed in statutes. In no case found by
the writer has such an act been held invalid, but unfortunately
the precise grounds of attack upon such statutes have not always
been made clear.3 5 Several interesting but less important Ohio
3

of Coldwater v. Tucker, (1877) 36 Mich. 474, 24 Am. Rep. 601.
6 Ida. 391, 55 Pac. 887 See also
McBean v. City of Fresno, (1896) 112 Cal. 159, 44 Pac. 358, Shreve v.
Town of Cicero, (1889) 129 Ill. 226, 21 N. F. 815, Cochran v. Village of
Park Ridge, (1891) 138 Ill. 295,'27 N. E. 939; Callon v. City of Jacksonville, (1893) 147 Ill. 113, 35 N. E. 223. Minnesota and M. Land and
Improvement Co. v. City of Billings, (1901) 111 Fed. 972, 50 C. C. A. 70.
In Loyd v. Mayor and Council of Columbus, (1892) 90 Ga. 20, 15 S. E.
818, the court held the construction of a ditch outside the city ultra vires
3City

3

4Wilson v. Boise City, (1899)

in 'the absence of empowering legislation, but this decision has been so
limited in effect by subsequent decisions as to be practically overruled.
3
5Cummms v. City of Seymour, (1881) 79 Ind. 491, 41 Am. Rep. 618,
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cases have held that where a village lies within a township, the
town authorities may construct drainage ditches beneficial to the
village and even partly within the village and to assess lands within
the village' as well as others for the costs.30 The principle in
these cases is, of course, that the village may continue to be, for
37
some purposes, a part of the township.
To transfer the sewage nuisance from within
to without the
city is not finally-to dispose of it, but really to transport it beyond
boundaries. The nuisance thus created beyond the city may be a
serious one, creating insanitary conditions and perhaps causing a
deterioration of property values. Where such is the case, and
where the city offiials are not acting ultra vires, injured persons
have an undoubted cause of action against the city.38 The city
may not with impunity pollute or alter a natural stream and thus
decrease its value to riparian owners or otherwise invade their
property rights,39 and in a New York case a town building a sewer
-through the streets of a neighboring town has been held liable to
compensate-abutting, owners for the taking of an additional easement. 40
HIGHWAYS, BRIDGES, FERRIES, AND RAILROADS

A system of city streets which began and ended within the
city and connected with no outside places is almost unthinkable. Highways are valuable to the extent that they open
"ways for comrnunication to other and far places. In numerous
case , however, the geographical situation is such that a city, if it
had no power to provide roads, bridges, ferries, and other facilities of travel beyond its boundaries, would find itself seriously
handicapped, for the county and the state are in many cases unVillage of South Orange v. Whittihgham, (1896) 58 N. J. L. 655, 35 Atl

407; Butler v. Town of Montclair, (1902) 67 N. J. L. 426, 51 At. 494;
Van 3 Brunt v. Town of Flatbush, (1891) 128 N. Y. 50, 27 N. F_. 973.
6Kent v. Perkins, (1881) 36 Ohio St. 639; Greek v. Joy, (1910) 81
Ohio3 St. 315, 90 N. E. 932.
sSee also Rumsey v. Town of Sauk Centre, (1894) 59 Minn. 316,

61 N.
W 330.
38

Loyd v. Mayor and Council of Columbus, (1892)

90 Ga. 20, 15

S. E. 818; Langley v. City Council of Augusta, (1903) 118 Ga. 590, 45
S. E. 486, 98 A. S. R. 133; Wilson v. Boise City, (1899) 6 Ida. 391,
55 Pac. 887;"Cummins v. City of Seymour, (1881) 79 Ind. 491, 41 Am.
Rep. 618;
Molden v. Town of Batavia (Ia. 1924) 200 N. W. 183.
39Forbes v. City of Jamestown, (1925) 212 App. Div. 332, 209 N. Y.
S. 99; City of Mansfield v. Balliett, (1901) 65 Ohio St. 451, 63 N. E. 86;
Good v. Altoona City, (1894) 162 Pa. 493, 29 Atl. 741. See also Tobey,
Public Health Law, 128-9, and cases cited; and Gould v. City of Rochester
(1887)40 105 N. Y. 46, 12 N. E. 275.
Van Brunt v. Town of.Flatbush, (1891) 128 N. Y. 50, 27 N. E. 973.
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able to build, or not interested in providing, the ways which will
bring travel and business to the city. Hence it is that we find
many statutes which empower cities in one way or another to
provide roads and other means of communication beyond their
limits.
Perhaps the first question for us is whether the provision of
roads and bridges extraterritorially is a constitutional purpose for
the levy and collection of taxes. This question is brought out more
clearly in the railroad cases, and it will for that reason be pertinent to discuss them here. Is the building of an extensive railroad system running many miles, perhaps h undreds of miles into
the country, a local public purpose, a purpose for which local
property owners may be taxed? The best American example of
a city owned railway is that of the Cincinnati Southern Railway
running from Cincinnati through Kentucky to Chattanooga, Tennessee, and owned by Cincinnati. When this road was projected
as a municipal enterprise it was opposed in the courts upon various constitutional grounds, of which the most important was the
alleged abuse of the taxing power. Upon this point the court
41
was fairly clear and emphatic.
"By the act under consideration, no railroads are authorized
to be constructed, except such as have one of their termini in the
city which constructs them. And that (a) city has no peculiar
interest in such channels of commerce as lead directly into it, is a
proposition which, to say the least, is very far from being clearly
true. And as the public or corporate interest in an improvement,
rather than its particular location, determines the question as to
the right of taxation for its construction, the fact that the road
contemplated in the present case will be mainly outside of this
state, can make no difference. The right of eminent domain cannot be exercised, nor the road constructed in or through other
states without their permission and authority; and the act in question contemplates nothing of the kind."
In a more recent Oregon case the court reached substantially
the same conclusion,," but indeed the law upon this point had been
laid down even before the Cincinnati decision in the cases involving municipal subscriptions to the building of railroads. 4 Prior
to the Civil War there had been decisions in Pennsylvania and
41

Walker v. Cincinnati, (1871) 21 Ohio St. 14.
Churchill v. Grants Pass, (1914) 70 Or. 283, 141 Pac. 164, Riggs v.
Grants
Pass, (1913) 66 Or. 266, 134 Pac. 776.
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Olcott v. Supervisors (1872) 16 Wall. (U.S.) 678, 21 L. Ed. 382,
and many other cases. The few contrary decisions are apparently not
based upon the theory that municipal tax revenues must be spent exclu42

sively upon improvements internal to the city.
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in Tennessee sustaining the power of cities to subscribe to railroads. 4 4 In the leading case of Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphta is was held by a majority of the judges that "a railroad is a
public highway for a public benefit," and that "it is a grave error
to suppose that the duty of a state stops with the establishment of
those institutions which are necessary to the existence of govern-

ment" 4 5

"But it is insiited that the right of a city or county to aid in
the construction of public works, must be confined to those works
which are within the locality whose people are to be taxed for
them. The Water Gap Company stops its road north of Vine
street, outside of the city limits, and the Hempfield road has its
eastern terminus at Greensburg, three hundred and forty-six
miles west of Philadelphia. I have already said that it is the interest of the city'which determines the right to tax her people.
That interest does not necessarily depend on the mere location of
the road. Therefore the location cannot be an infallible criterion.
If the city cannot have an interest in a road which stops in the
Northern Liberties; then Dock Ward can have no interest in one
which terminates in Upper Delaware Ward, and all the subdivisions of the city, which it does not actually enter, may be
exempted on the same score. A railroad may run through a
county without doing its inhabitants the least service. May such
a county assist to make it, while a city which it supplies with bread
and whose-trade is doubled by it must not do so, merely because
it ends outside of an imaginary line that limits the corporate
jurisdiction? It seems very plain that a city may have exactly the
same interest in a road which terminates outside of her borders,
as if the depot were within them, and a great deal more than if it
passed quite through. If she has an interest in any part, she has
probably an equal interest in every part. Railroads are generally
made-to connect important trading points with each other. The
want of a link at one place breaks the desired connection as much
as at another. Philadelphia has now a road to Greensburg. The
Hempfield Company proposes to carry it on to Wheeling. I do
not see that the city is not as much interested in the Hempfield
road as she would be in making an inddpendent road, starting at
the corner of Schuylkill Fifth and Market Streets, and running
by way of Greensburg the whole distance to Wheeling.
"But it is not our business to determine what amount of interest
44
Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, (1853) 21 Pa. St. 147, Nichol
v. Mayor and Aldermen of Nashville, (1848) 9 Humph. (Tenn.) 257,

Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co. v. County Court, (1854)

1 Sneed

(Tenn.) 636; McCallie v. Mayor and Aldermen of Chattanooga, (1859)

3 Head (Tenn.) 318.
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Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, (1853)

21 Pa. St. 147, 169.
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Philadelphia has in either of these improvements. That has been
settled by her own officers, and by the legislature. 40
No conclusion can be drawn from this and the Tennessee
cases cited other than that it is a public purpose, and in Tennessee
a "corporation purpose," to help to build railroads out from and
into the city to promote the commercial prosperity of the place.
The roads do not need even to come directly into the city to be of
public interest to it, if they come to its doors or connect with
roads which do.
In the railroad cases the points discussed were essentially constitutional, and bore primarily upon the taxing power. Several
highway and bridge cases have raised the same question. In a
Missoun case where the legislature had authorized a city to levy a
tax "to be appropriated to the subscription and payment for the
improvement of roads leading into the city, and promoting the
trade and commerce thereof," and the tax was opposed as lacking
due process, the court said that "to settle the case finally, we add
that the Legislature had power to authorize the City of Lagrange
to 'spend money upon the improvement of roads outside of the
limits of the city 47 In a North Dakota bridge case, where the
decision was really rested upon other grounds, while the court
seemed to have some doubts whether an expenditure merely for
promoting the commercial prosperity of the city was for a public
purpose, it refused to assent to the contention "that there can be
no expenditure for a corporate purpose, the object of which is
48
located outside of its boundaries.
The well considered Brooklyn Bridge case dealt with that
section of the New York constitution which forbids a city to
incur debt "except for city purposes. '40 Since New York and
Brooklyn were then separate municipalities, it was contended that
New York could not legally borrow money to expend upon a
bridge partly outside of its boundaries. The court, after asserting broadly that certain expenditures would not be for a city purpose, went on to assert that an outside source of water supply
would be, as would also a park for the health and comfort of the
inhabitants, if convenient to tfie city.
"Such improvements are for the common and general benefit
of all the citizens, and have always been regarded as within the
46
Sharpless v. Mayor
47
Hagood v. Hutton,
48

of Philadelphia, (1853) 21 Pa. St. 147, 171-72.
(1862) 33 Mo. 244.
Manning v. Devils Lake, (1904) 13 N. D. 47, 99 N. W 51, 65
L. R. A. 187
49N. Y. const. art. 8, sec. 11, now sec. 10.
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scope of municipal. government; and so the highways or streets
leading into a city or village may be improved, provided the improvements be confined within such limits that they may be regarded, as for the common lenefit and enjoyment of all the citizens. It cannot therefore well be held, as claimed by the learned
counsel for the appellants, that what is meant by a city purpose is
some work or expenditure within the city limits." 50
These adjudications may be accepted as fairly decisive of the
constitutionality of municipal expenditures for or in aid of the
constructionand improvement of railroads, roads and bridges beyond city limits. They do not, however, tell us whether the
power to make such expenditures may be implied, nor do they
throw any light upon the question of what if any powers of control a city gets over outside roads and bridges aided. In an early
New York case the question was whether a village might receive
by deed certain lands beyond village limits to be used for streets.51
Finding no express authority for this act in either the charter or
statutes the court held that, while "the legislature might have conferred upon this corporation powers extending beyond its limits,
it is regarded as obvious that, in the absence of express language
looking to such an extension of its powers, they are all to be talken
as commensurate only with its territorial limits and jurisdictions."
A -concurring judge showed that power to lay out and regulate
highways was conferred upon the towns in wuch lay the lands and
streets in question, and that this power must be considered to be
exclusive if serious jurisdictional conflicts were to be avoided. A
like point was made in the North Dakota bridge case already mentioned, but the main point in that case seems to have been that,
even if the city had built the bridge in question, it might have been
totally useless since the proper county and town authorities had
not yet established-the road. To prevent such conflicts of authority the statutes in Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and other states
merely authorize .cities to appropriate and spend money to aid in
the improvement of roads outside their limits, and give no power
of control.1 2 We may fairly conclude, therefore, that the power
to engage in definitely extraterritorial road activities should be
5
OPeople ex. rel. Murphy v. Kelly, (1879) 76 N. Y. 475, 487-8. See
also Haeussler v. City of St. Louis, (1907) 205 Mo. 656, 103 S. W 1034.

5'Riley v. Rochester, (1853) 9 N. Y. 64.

52Sed Peterson v. City of Jordan, (1917) 135 Minn. 384, 160 N. NV.
1028, Pennsylvania Third Class City Law, (1921) p. 392 (act of May 23,
1913, P L. 336).
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clearly expressed, and that the courts will construe these grants
of power strictly 13
Where the improvement is a bridge, however, and must be
built as a complete unit to be of any value at all, a different view
might conceivably be taken. Thus in a Kentucky county case,
where the statute provided a special method by which inter-county
bridges might be built by joint action, the federal supreme court
held nevertheless that such method was not exclusive and that a
single county might under its ordinary power to construct bridges
build a bridge over a boundary stream into the adjoining county."
FERRIES AND WHARVES

A ferry is in one sense a part of the highway, and might even
be denominated a moving bridge. The rules as to extraterritorial
ferries are, therefore, not unlike those governing highways and
bridges. That cities may be empowered to aid in the maintenance of
extraterritorial ferries is, consequently, well established by long
practice and several direct decisions. 55 It has been held, however,
that a power to make ordinances to "promote the prosperity" of
the town does not carry with it the power to establish a free ferry
at a distance of over one-half mile from the corporate limits. "To
engage in such enterprises, express grants are required.""0 On
the other hand, the city of St. Louis, without express charter
power, has been held empowered simply as a corporation to acquire lands outside of the city for wharf purposes.5 7
EXTRA-STATE POWERS

It is particularly in connection with the railroad, highway,
bridge, and ferry cases that questions sometimes arise as to a
city's power to go beyond the boundaries of the state to provide
some public facility or to promote some improvement or service.
53
City Council of Montgomery v. Montgomery and Wetumpka PlankRoad Co., (1857) 31 Ala. 76; Municipality Number One v. Young, (1850)
5 La. Ann. 362, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Porter, (1862)
18 Md. 284. An express power to contribute to the maintenance of extraterritorial highways does not carry with it any power to control the
highways aided or any liability for negligent maintenance thereof. Peterson v. City of Jordan, (1917) 135 Minn. 384, 160 N. W 1028.
54
Washer v. Bullitt County, (1884) 110 U. S.558, 28 L. Ed. 249,
4 Sup. Ct. 249; and see also Dively v. City of Cedar Falls, (1869) 27
Iowa 227
274, 79 N. E. 689; Peter55Helm v. City of Grayville, (1906) 224 Ill.
son v. City of Jordan, (1917) 135 Minn. 384, 160 N. W 1028; Power v.
Village of Athens, (1885) 99 N. Y. 592, 2 N. E. 609.
of Jacksonport v. Watson (1878) 33 Ark. 704.
56Town
57
Hafner v. City of St. Louis, (1901) 161 Mo. 34, 61 S. Ar 632.
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In a Connecticut case it was held not to be a proper town charge
to contribute to the-construction of a bridge over the Byram river
into the state of New York. 58 The same decision was reached
in a West Virginia case where a town had agreed to contribute to
an interstate bridge which was built jointly by Allegheny County,
Maryland, and Mineral County, West Virginia, over the Potomac
5
river. 9
A Wisconsin case possesses even more points of interest.00
The legislature authorized the city of La Crosse to build a bridge
over the Mississippi river, together with necessary approaches
on both sides, and the Minnesota legislature at the same time
authorized the work to be done, including the construction of a
road in Houston County, Minnesota, to a point of connection with
a lawful Minnesota highway. The Minnesota act went further,
providing that the city of La Crosse should be liable in tort for
injuries arising out of improper maintenance of the road. In due
course a person injured brought suit in the Wisconsin courts
against the city of La Crosse for an injury sustained upon the road
on the Minnesota side, and cited the Minnesota statute as creating
the liability The Wisconsin supreme court was willing to concede
the power of the legislature to authorize the city to bridge the Mississippi, but averred that the Wisconsin law referred to "did not
and could not grant the right to the city to build and maintain a
highway two and one-half miles long, on the bottom lands of the
river in the state of Minnesota." As to the act of the Minnesota
legislature, the court was unable to see how it altered the situation, for to permit the city "to accept rights, and to assume duties,
beyond the power of, its creator to enforce or to regulate, would
be an innovation we are not prepared to sanction. From the very
necessities of the situation, it [the city] would have no power to
regulate or protect its erections in a foreign jurisdiction." Consequently the city's road activities in Minnesota were ultra vires,
and the city was not liable since it was "without authority, under
its charter or the law of this state, to accept privileges or assume
duties and obligations to be performed outside of the limits and
beyond the jurisdiction of this state."'6
58Abenroth v. T6wn of Greenwich, (1860)

29 Conn. 356.

59

County Court v. Town of Piedmont, (1913) 72 W Va. 296, 78
S. E.6 63.
OBecker v. La Crosse, (1898) 99 Wis. 414, 75 N. W 84, 67 A. S. R.
874, 640 L. 1. A. 829.
'Becker -v. La Crosse (1898) 99 Wis. 414, 75 N. W 84, 67 A. S. IL
874, 40 L. R. A. 829. It is not irrelevant to point out in this connection
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That a city may be authorized to bridge interstate rivers has
been sustained also in a case involving the city of St. Louis,"3
but the rule as to non-liability for the negligent maintenance of a
bridge or highway in an adjoining state has also recently been
reiterated.6 3
PARKS

In the case of water supplies, quarries, and various other
facilities, cities sometimes go outside to acquire and to bring back
into the city products useful to the people. A different case is that
of parks, which cities in many cases establish outside of their
limits in order to induce local residents to leave the city for fresh
air and recreation. As a rule it appears that cities do not attempt
to establish extraterritorial parks without clear legislative authority In a famous New York case it was questioned whether the
city could take lands by condemnation "in the adjacent district
04
of. Westchester county" even under express legislative authority.
It was argued, inter alia, that an expenditure for parks outside
of the city was not for a "city purpose," as provided in the state
constitution, even though parks within city limits would be for a
city purpose.
"If a city may go three miles from its nearest boundary, and
with the connecting ribbon of a 'parkway,' take Pelham bay and
Hunter's island, why, it is asked, may it not take the Falls of
Niagara, or a mountain of the Adirondacks, or land in Dutcheqs
county, and building a road thither, claim it to be a 'city purpose'?
The question is a fair one and demands an answer."
The answer, given at length by the court, traversed the legislation authorizing the city to go forty miles outside to spend milthat Wisconsin and Minnesota have concurrent jurisdiction over all tho.e
portions of the Mississippi, St. Croix, and other rivers which form the
boundary between them. 11 Stat. at L. 166-67 Municipalities lying opposite each other along these streams exercise concurrent and overlapping
jurisdiction
over the entire breadth of the stream.
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Haeussler v. City of St. Louis, (1907) 205 Mo. 656, 103 S.W 1034.
The present charter of the city provides that the city shall have power
"to condemn private property, real or personal, or any easement or
use therein for public use withii or without the city or state." Section
1, subdiv. (9). At first glance it would appear absurd for St. Louis to
attempt to empower itself under a freeholders' (home rule) charter
to condemn land in another state, yet it is entirely conceivable that for
bridge building purposes the city might, with the consent of the national
government or of the state of Illinois, condemn land in Illinois for the
eastern approaches and piers of the bridge. See also Walker v. Cincinnati, 3(1871) 21 Ohio St. 14.
6 Valentine v. Alleghany County, (1924) 146 Md. 199, 126 Atd. 147
See 11 Va. Law Rev. 403.
64Matter of Mayor, etc., of New York, (1885) 99 N. Y. 569, 2 N. E.
642. Judge Dillon was of counsel for the city.
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lions, in the acquisition of lands and water rights, for a water
supply, and to build the Brooklyn bridge into Brooklyn, as well
as other laws authorizing cities to annex lands for parks, and to
establish cemeteries, hospitals, pesthouses, and ferries beyond
city limits. The court concluded that the "test of a city purpose,
which asks if the property bought and the money spent go outside
of the corporate boundaries must be abandoned."
"The purpose must be- primarily the benefit, use or convenience of the city as distinguished from that of the public outside
of it, although they may be incidentally benefited, and the work
[must] be of such a character as to show plainly the predominance
of that purpose. And then the thing to be done must be within
the ordinary range of municipal action. Acquiring and maintaining parks is within that range. Acg uiring them so near to. the city
as to make them convenient and accessible and likely to be overtaken and .surrounded by the city's growth, satisfies the first condition, while a park in the Adirondacks or at Niagara would not
satisfy it at all."
Other cases of express legislative authority given to cities to
establish extraterritorial parks can easily be found. 5 Whether
the power can be'implied has not been frequently 4djudicated,
but in a Mississippi case it was held that a city had power to take
land under a devise "for a public park" just outside of the city's
limits, and that the park would be for a city purpose despite its
outside location. 5 It was the opinion of the judges, however,
that the city could exercise over such land "only those rights and
powers which spring from ownership."' 6
MISCELLANEOUS EXTRATERRiTORIAL PROPERTY

The, establishment of crematories, cemeteries, workhouses,
poor houses, quarantine stations, and hospitals outside of city
limits is a common practice which can be justified in the interests
of public health and safety.era
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Mayor v. Park Commissioners (Thompson v. Moran), (1880) 44
Mich.-602, 7 N. W 180; Booth v. City of Minneapolis, (Minn. 1925)
203 N. W 625, involving a public golf links; Matter of Department of
Public.Parks, (1889) 53 Hun (N.Y.) 280; City of Cleveland v. Painter,
.(1908) 6 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 129.
66Lester v. Mayor, etc., of City of Jackson, (1892) 69 Miss. 887, 11

So. 114.
67See also note 22, above. By chapter 127 of the Laws of Minnesota
for 1917, the city of Stillwater was authorized to accept a gift of land in
the-adjoining state of Wisconsin "and to improve and govern the same."
Obviously the Minnesota legislature could not confer any police powers
over the land in question.
67aTrustees of Youngstown Township v. City of Youngstown, (1903)
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Other cases of extraterritorial ownership of property arise
frequently out of the division of cities and towns and the changes
which are so frequently made in their boundaries. In such cases
the courts have generally reached the conclusion that each of the
municipalities concerned obtains or retains ownership or control of
the public real property which falls within its new boundaries, but
gains or keeps no control of public property falling outside.0 8 The
reasons for this general rule are undoubtedly sound and need not
be restated here. They are not, however, based upon any supposed
constitutional inability of cities to own or control property outside
of city limits. In an interesting New Jersey case the court held
that a sewage system needs to be operated as a unit, and that a
division of the corporate territory whereby some of the sewer
laterals fell outside of the original corporation did not deprive it
of control over them."' In a Minnesota case a schoolhouse which
fell outside of the original district upon a change of boundaries
was held to remain the property of that district although it could
no longer make use of it and could probably do nothing but sell
it. 70 These cases are referred to not as establishing a general rule
of law, but as illustrations of court decisions which sanction ownership of property outside of city limits. If we refer to charters and
statutes we find many other examples. Many cities are empowered
by their charters to acquire lands within or without their corporate limits for all lawful corporate purposes.7 1 In some states
this power now extends to the establishment of municipal forest
reserves, 72 but the most astounding acts of all are some which
incorporate port authorities. An Oregon act of 1909, as amended
in 1915, authorized ports to improve bays, rivers and harbors
6 Ohio C. C. (N.S) 498, Allentown v. Wagner, (1906) 214 Pa. St. 210,
63 At. 697, aff'g 27 Pa. Supcr. Ct. 485.
the many decisions to this effect we cite only Commissioners
6sOf
of Laramie County v. Commissioners of Albany County, (1875) 92 U. S.

307, 23 L. Ed. 552.

69Bloomfield v. Glen Ridge. (1897) 55 N. J. Eq. 505, 37 At. 63. This
decision reversed the findings of law in the earlier and more frequently
cited 0decision of a single judge in 54 N. J. Eq. 276, 33 Atd. 925 (1896).
7 Winona v. School District No. 82, (1889) 40 Minn. 13, 41 N. W
539, 3 L. R. A. 46, 12 A. S. R. 687
7For example any "home rule" city in Minnesota may, in the charter
which it frames and adopts for its own government, authorize itself "to
acquire, by gift, devise, purchase, or condemnation any property within
or without its boundaries, needed for the full discharge of any public
function which it is permitted to exercise." G. S. 1913 sec. 1345, as
amended by Laws 1921, chap. 343.
72Pennsylvania, Third Class City Law, (1921) p. 531. Other examplcs
of this power can be found.
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within their limits and between their limits and the sea, to exercise the power of eminent domain for any of their purposes, "to
exercise control of all bays, rivers, and harbors within their limits,
and between their limits and the sea," to establish and maintain
tugboat and pilotage services, to charter, own, maintain and operate ships of all kinds, to engage generally in the coastwise trade,
to establish 'and operate water transport lines on any navigable
waters of Oregon or waters tributary thereto, to acquire and
operate railroad terminals, to carry freight and passengers, and
to engage generally in the buying and selling of coal, fuel, and
,oil for' steam and power boats, and so on.73 The Webbs in all
their researches into English local government probably found
no more striking example than this of the conferment of extraterritorial powers upon public local corporations.
(To be concluded.)
3
7 See State ex rel. v. Port of Astoria, (1916) 79 Or. 1, 154 Pac. 399.
We do not in the text discuss the power of cities to receive extraterritorial property in trust for charitable and other uses. This power appears
to have been upheld even in cases where the property lay outside of the
state. Girard v. City of New Orleans, (1847) 2 La. Ann. 897, Chambers
v. City of St. Louis, (1860) 29 Mo. 543; Vidal v. Girard's Executors,
(1844) 2.How. (U.S.) 128, 11 L. Ed. 205; Executors of McDonogh V. Murdoch, (1853) 15 How. (U.S.) 367, 14 L. Ed. 732.

